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Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to
Loose-Knit Groups
Lior Jacob Strahilevitzt
In 1991, Bob Ellickson's book about ranchers who raise cattle in
an isolated California county launched an important new movement
in the legal academy.' Scholars in this law and social norms movement
began asking a series of interesting questions about the role of infor-
mal rules governing human relations, largely in an effort to determine
whether these norms provide a more efficient structure of governance
than formal law.
Law and social norms scholars with empirical inclinations have,
for the most part, continued to study the emergence and maintenance
of social norms in communities that resemble Shasta County's close-
knit group. A close-knit group is a network in which power is broadly
distributed and information pertinent to informal control circulates
easily among network members. Typically, close-knit groups are made
up of repeat players who can identify one another.
More recently, legal scholars interested in social norms have be-
gun to examine how social norms might arise and be enforced in con-
texts with more anonymous subjects or fewer repeat players.' Among
these non-close-knit groups, it is important to distinguish between two
types. Loose-knit groups are clusters of individuals among whom in-
t Assistant Professor, The University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Amitai Aviram,
Richard Epstein, Dan Kahan, Saul Levmore, Tracey Meares, Randy Picker, Eric Posner, Cass
Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule for comments on an earlier draft.
1 Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard 1991).
2 The best exemplar is Lisa Bernstein's scholarship. See, for example, Lisa Bernstein, Pri-
vate Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms; and
Institutions, 99 Mich L Rev 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Re-
thinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U Pa L Rev 1765 (1996). See also
Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 49-67 (Harvard 2000) (discussing gift-giving among
members of close-knit groups); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw U L Rev 77 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, Group
Norm, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U Pa L Rev 2237 (1996); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the
Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 1990).
3 See Ellickson, Order without Law at 177-78 (cited in note 1).
4 For examples of scholarship that begin to address questions concerning norms among
non-close-knit groups, see Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 Cal L Rev 1231 (2001); Tamar
Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 BU L Rev 457,469-74 (2001); Dan M. Ka-
han, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 BU L Rev 333,340-44 (2001); April Mara Major, Norm
Origin and Development in Cyberspace: Models of Cybernorm Evolution, 78 Wash U L Q 59
(2000); Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 Chi Kent L Rev 1257
(1998). None of these works refers to loose-knit groups or intermediate-knit groups as such.
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formation pertinent to informal control does not circulate easily.
These loose-knit groups are typically composed of members who do
not expect to be repeat players or who are unable to gather accurate
information about another member's reputation even if repeat-player
interactions do occur. Intermediate-knit groups are groups where two
conditions are satisfied: (1) a member is not alone, but is proximate to
or can be observed by companions with whom he anticipates having
repeat interactions, and (2) information pertinent to informal social
control flows easily between him and his companions but does not
flow easily between him and strangers who are members of the inter-
mediate-knit group. Thus an intermediate-knit group member antici-
pates having repeat-player interactions with his proximate compan-
ions, but not with the strangers who are also members of the group.
In this Essay, I will discuss in general terms what legal scholars
might expect to find as we begin looking for social norms "off the
ranch." I will suggest that cooperation may be no less rare in loose-
knit groups than in close-knit groups, but that the mechanisms by
which cooperative norms arise and are enforced are different. Next, I
will suggest that the social environments ultimately most deserving of
attention are these intermediate-knit groups. Finally, I will provide a
brief sketch of a few interesting intermediate-knit environments and
point out some of the unresolved questions concerning the behavioral
regularities that arise therein.
I. CLOSE-KNIT GROUPS
Today's law and social norms movement has as its foundational
text Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. In that book,
Ellickson argued that even where the legal regime had established
rules to govern frequently recurring disputes among cattle ranchers,
such as animal trespass or the maintenance of common fences, ranch-
ers often remained ignorant of the formal law or consciously disre-
garded it.5 Instead, disputes were resolved based on informal norms
that often deviated from the formal legal rules. Perhaps most startling
and compelling was Ellickson's hypothesis that the informal norms of-
ten provided a more efficient governance regime than the formal legal
rules.6 He argued that close-knit environments are particularly condu-
cive to the development of efficient social norms since members' de-
pendence on each other makes them value their reputations and the
cost of obtaining and exchanging information about members is low.7
5 See Ellickson, Order without Law at 141-47 (cited in note 1).
6 See id at 167.
7 See id at 180-81.
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What, then, of non-close-knit groups? Ellickson noted that his
hypothesis of efficient norms in close-knit groups "does not predict
that the norm-making process would lead to the evolution of coopera-
tion in a transient social environment such as a singles bar at O'Hare
Airport."8 Where group members are either anonymous or unlikely to
engage in repeat-player interactions, all bets are off.
In the twelve years since the publication of Order without Law,
no legal scholar has looked at loose-knit groups systematically. Nor
has anyone attempted to answer comprehensively the questions left
open by the Shasta County versus O'Hare singles bar contrast.
Namely, do social norms arise in loose-knit groups? If so, what is the
mechanism by which they arise and are enforced? Finally, to the ex-
tent that such norms do arise and persist, will they generally maximize
group welfare?
II. LOOSE-KNIT GROUPS
To the best of my knowledge, there are no singles bars at O'Hare
Airport. Setting aside the provocative question of what cooperation
might look like in a singles bar, Ellickson was on the right track in us-
ing such a bar to exemplify a non-close-knit setting. Many of the trav-
elers at our hypothetical airport singles bar would never expect to en-
counter their fellow patrons again. O'Hare serves a large and heavily
populated metropolitan area and, in any event, many people passing
the time at O'Hare are merely waiting for a connection to a distant
city. Loose-knit groups typically consist of clusters of individuals who,
like these travelers, are unlikely to be repeat players or are otherwise
unable to identify each other in repeat interactions without great dif-
ficulty.9 The nature of the location renders this bar an unlikely place
for meeting someone whom one will encounter unintentionally in the
future.
The Napster network, created in 1999 by a college student named
Shawn Fanning, was the internet's first successful large-scale peer-to-
peer network and its most successful loose-knit group.'° Napster al-
lowed tens of millions of users to swap sound recordings with other
anonymous users. The network was astonishingly popular, both in the
United States and abroad, until the Recording Industry Association of
America obtained injunctive relief that required Napster to cease
8 Id at 169.
9 Ellickson includes widespread distribution of power among group members as an ele-
ment of his definition of close-knit groups. That does not mean that a group with a hierarchical
distribution of power should be thought of as loose-knit, or that all loose-knit groups necessarily
are characterized by power disparities among the membership.
10 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Coopera-
tion on the File Swapping Networks, 89 Va L Rev (forthcoming 2003).
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permitting its users to swap copyrighted sound recordings." At that
point, KaZaA, Morpheus, AudioGalaxy Satellite, and various applica-
tions using the Gnutella network filled the void left by Napster's de-
mise." The networks were so large, and their structure was so diffuse
that it was rather rare for a member to swap files with the same mem-
ber over the course of multiple sessions. Moreover, because the only
identifying information given about each user was a self-chosen pseu-
donym usually consisting of a word combined with a series of num-
bers, users might have failed to remember the identifiers of those with
whom they had previously engaged in successful cooperative ex-
changes.
Commuting to work provides another example of loose-knit
interactions. In the United States, people generally do not commute to
work with friends or loved ones. Rather, they either drive alone or use
mass transportation. In large metropolitan areas, drivers are unlikely
to know or recognize the solo drivers of other vehicles, and there is no
expectation that a motorist tailgating another driver's vehicle will in-
teract with the same driver in the future. The same sort of interactions
among anonymous strangers occur on metropolitan subways.'" When
we see solo commuters interacting on an urban freeway or in a sub-
way car, we therefore have a chance to observe them unconstrained
by concerns about negative gossip directed at peers who can sanction
them at a later date."
Loose-knit environments give us an opportunity to study norms
in contexts where a rational choice account of how norms arise and
are enforced is implausible. Cooperation on a peer-to-peer network,
subway, or freeway cannot result from signaling7 or esteem-seeking,' 8
the two most persuasive explanations for how social norms arise in
close-knit groups.
11 See A & M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc, 239 F3d 1004 (9th Cir 2001).
12 Strahilevitz, 89 Va L Rev (cited in note 10).
13 See http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/cb02ffl3.html (visited Dec 2, 2002)
(noting that according to the 2000 census, 76 percent of commuters drove alone to work, 12 per-
cent carpooled, and 5 percent used public transportation).
14 See Clifton Hood, Changing Perceptions of Public Space on the New York Rapid Transit
System, 22 J Urban Hist 308, 310-11 (1996).
15 Loose-knit groups typically, but not always, involve large numbers of actors. A house-
hold of twenty individuals suffering from advanced Alzheimer's disease or some other form of
serious memory loss could constitute a loose-knit group. The actors' inability to recall past inter-
actions and disseminate information about other actors' reputations and norm violations would
resemble the consequences of anonymity in a large-numbers situation.
16 See Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and
Social Norms, 36 U Richmond L Rev 367,376 (2002).
17 See generally Posner, Law and Social Norms (cited in note 2).
18 See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 Mich L Rev 338 (1997).
19 Sophisticated rational choice models that account for herd behavior or the stability of
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Yet cooperation does arise in loose-knit environments, and some-
times it can be robust. My study of file-sharing on a peer-to-peer net-
work in 2001 revealed that although free-riding on other users' files
was costless and essentially undetectable, a majority of network users
still shared some portions of their files with other users.2 0 Moreover,
most of these sharing users appeared to be doing so consciously, de-
spite the costs and illegality associated with such behavior.2' Along the
same lines, anecdotal evidence concerning roadway behavior some-
times suggests surprisingly high levels of cooperation among anony-
mous solo motorists." The same is evidently true of anonymous sub-
way riders.2 As we study these environments further, we might ob-
serve the emergence of predictable wealth-maximizing norms without
opportunities for peer pressure or other forms of informal sanctions.2A
alternative focal points might provide a somewhat more satisfying explanation for why coopera-
tion emerges in loose-knit groups. See generally H. Peyton Young, The Economics of Coopera-
tion, 10 J Econ Persp 105 (1996). For example, in the absence of other information, people might
mimic the behavior of a crowd on the (often incorrect) assumption that members of the crowd
possess valuable private information. See Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34
Wake Forest L Rev 639, 646-47 (1999); Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,
107 Q J Econ 797,798-99 (1992). While herd behavior provides a plausible explanation for why
individuals on the peer-to-peer networks do not fear legal sanctions as a result of their file-
swapping behavior, conventional accounts of herd behavior generally have been limited to in-
stances where an individual is trying to improve his own welfare. To take Banerjee's example, an
individual deciding between two restaurants may opt for the more crowded one because he be-
lieves he is more likely to get a better meal. But herd behavior explanations rarely have been
used to explain cooperation that is costly for an individual. To use a recent illustration, in the
wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon,
nearly a million Americans lined up to donate blood. See Sacha Pfeiffer, With Blood Supply Up,
Red Cross Drive Rapped, Boston Globe Al (Sept 28, 2001). But few would argue that the long
queues outside blood donation centers convinced Americans that it was in their personal interest
to donate blood, and that those standing in line had valuable inside information about the rela-
tive costs and benefits of donating. A social-psychology-based theory of reciprocity provides a
more satisfying explanation for the widespread cooperation observed during the aftermath of
those attacks.
20 See Strahilevitz, 89 Va L Rev (cited in note 10).
21 See id. Much of the sharing that occurred was inconsistent with the default options built
into the software, suggesting users' conscious choices about whether and how much to share.
22 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:
Commodifying California's Carpool Lanes, 75 Ind L J 1231, 1274 (2000) (discussing motorists
who move aside in favor of faster vehicles); Toshio Yamagishi and Karen S. Cook, Generalized
Exchange and Social Dilemmas, 56 Soc Psychol Q 235,238 (1993) (discussing drivers' assistance
to fellow motorists stranded in the snow). But see Robert F Blomquist, American 'Road Rage':A
Scary and Tangled Cultural-Legal Pastiche, 80 Neb L Rev 17,23-34 (2001) (providing examples
of 'road rage,' in which motorists behave uncooperatively).
23 See Matthew L. Fried and Victor J. DeFazio, Territoriality and Boundary Conflicts in the
Subway, 37 Psych 47,55 (1974) (noting that many subway riders stand in a more crowded section
of a subway car in order to avoid intruding on the personal space of a male-female couple stand-
ing in a less crowded section). See also Hood, 22 J Urban Hist at 325-26 (cited in note 14) (dis-
cussing subway riders' widespread efforts to assist panhandling subway riders and homeless
subway dwellers during the Great Depression).
24 In loose-knit settings, where reputational concerns are minimized, some scholars have
questioned whether the tag "social norms" is apropos. See, for example, Jon Elster, Rationality,
The University of Chicago Law Review
To explain loose-knit cooperation, some scholars have turned
from rational-choice-based accounts of why individuals cooperate to-
ward social-psychology-based conceptions of human behavior. For ex-
ample, Dan Kahan argues that individuals in a group setting
reciprocate the behavior of others: if they perceive that other
group members are restraining themselves in the face of tempta-
tions to behave contrary to a group's collective interests, most in-
dividuals display similar self-restraint; if, in contrast, they become
convinced that those around are putting their own interests
ahead of the group's, most individuals again respond in kind,
availing themselves of any available opportunities to advance
their own interests at the expense of collective ones.5
Because of these reciprocal motivations, cooperation-promoting
norms can arise.
There are numerous examples of conditional cooperation that
arise in non-close-knit settings, and it is difficult to reconcile such co-
operation with some of the rational choice models legal scholars have
applied in close-knit settings. Among the examples Kahan uses are
contributions to National Public Radio (people are inclined to give
when they see others giving),26 and paying income taxes (people are
more inclined to pay their own taxes when they perceive others in
their jurisdiction to be paying their taxes). 7
Conditional cooperation hypotheses are satisfying in the sense
that the dynamics described are supported by empirical and experi-
mental data.2 They are unsatisfying in that they provide too little ex-
Morality, and Collective Action, 96 Ethics 136, 153 (1985). I use the term "social norms" to in-
clude behavioral regularities that arise when humans are interacting with each other, regardless
of whether that interaction is face-to-face. This definition, unlike some others, does not presup-
pose a particular mechanism by which these norms arise, but does require that the regularity be
connected to the group setting. Thus, it is improper to speak of a social norm of "breathing"
among restaurant customers, but there may be a norm of tipping.
25 Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: A Theory of Collective Action and Law ch 2,
p 2 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See also id at ch 2, p 11-12 (discussing the sali-
ent differences between the rational choice account of collective action and the theory of recip-
rocity).
26 Id at ch 2, p 17-18.
27 Id at ch 3, p 11-18.
28 See, for example, Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Eco-
nomic Implications of Homo Reciprocans, 42 European Econ Rev 845 (1998) (presenting evi-
dence of conditional cooperation from ultimatum bargaining games and many real-world envi-
ronments); Sally Ann Shumaker and James S. Jackson, The Aversive Effects of Nonreciprocated
Benefits, 42 Soc Psychol Q 148 (1979) (presenting data showing that people who are helped by
strangers often feel the need to reciprocate, either by returning the favor directly to the helper,
or by helping other strangers instead). Experimental research also shows that many people will
abandon their strongly-held beliefs about whether particular ideas are true or false in the face of
a contrary group consensus. See, for example, Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in
Elliot Aronson, ed, Readings about the Social Animal 13, 13-22 (W.H. Freedman 1995).
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planation for mechanisms causing people to condition their coopera-
tion on others' cooperation. The beginnings of a satisfying explanation
might be found in a recent study concluding that women who cooper-
ated with other anonymous women in a prisoner's dilemma experi-
ment experienced stimulation in areas of the brain associated with
pleasure, but that women who were told they were playing the game
with a computer-rather than a person-did not experience such
stimulation, even when they cooperated to the same extent.29 If further
research confirms this fascinating finding, loose-knit noncooperation
may become the puzzle crying out for an explanation.
III. INTERMEDIATE-KNIT GROUPS
An intermediate-knit group's dynamics reflect both a loose-knit
and a close-knit phenomenon. In an intermediate-knit group, strang-
ers will be interacting with other strangers, but they will do so while
surrounded by non-strangers."
29 See James K. Rilling, et al, A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35 Neuron 395,401
(2002).
30 Note that my typology of close-knit, intermediate-knit, and loose-knit environments is
not an exhaustive list. Hybrid environments also exist. Internet dating networks are a recent ex-
ample of a hybrid environment. On these networks, members typically will have an expectation
of engaging in repeat-player interactions with certain other members. More precisely, they will
want to date some of the other members of the network. At the same time, the networks are
structured so that information pertinent to informal social control does not circulate easily
among members. Indeed, the networks have, for understandable reasons, eschewed the kind of
reputation-tracking devices that eBay has used so successfully, and the proprietors of the net-
works have apparently decided that there is little they can or should do to curtail the endemic
deception and puffery that exists among network members. See generally Sarah Anchors, Per-
sonal-Ad Precautions Reduce Risk of Unknown, Ariz Republic 2E (Aug 23, 2002); Lessley
Anderson, OyBay, Industry Standard 124 (Sept 11, 2000).
31 Ann Carlson uses recycling as a case study to examine norm formation in "large-
number, small-payoff" settings. See Carlson, 89 Cal L Rev at 1299 (cited in note 4). She views
these situations as the opposite of close-knit group interactions, and asserts that "social norms
are less likely to develop within large groups." Id at 1235. In my view, the salient theoretical issue
is not the size of the relevant community per se. Rather, it is the community members' ability to
monitor instances of noncooperation and communicate with fellow members about each mem-
ber's reputation; these factors, rather than group size, frame the likely mechanisms by which co-
operation might arise. Thus, the eBay auctioning network exhibits extremely impressive levels of
user cooperation, despite its millions of members, thanks to an ingenious mechanism for tracking
each user's reputation. See Frankel, 81 BU L Rev at 471 (cited in note 4). Through its reputation
scoring, eBay is transformed from a loose-knit group into an intermediate- or even close-knit
group. Similarly, a very small community that lacked the ability to track each member's reputa-
tion for cooperation, such as the Alzheimer's patients referenced in note 15, has more in com-
mon with the Napster community than it does with other small-number groups.
I would argue that recycling is properly understood as a classic intermediate-knit case. Resi-
dential curbside recycling in a neighborhood of single-family residences superficially presents a
close-knit case study, yet recycling behavior may be motivated more by mass media messages,
perceptions of society-wide behavior, or other factors having little to do with individual reputa-
tion or community members' fear of negative gossip.
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The story of modernization in America and around the world is
one of movement from close-knit groups to intermediate-knit groups.
Intermediate-knit interactions have become ubiquitous. Think of an
evening at a cinema or sporting event, a charity fundraiser, a family
vacation at Disneyland, an urban riot following a controversial jury
verdict, a student study session at Starbucks, or a group of youths
causing trouble at an urban parade. An individual is likely to partici-
pate in all of these social settings accompanied by people he knows,
yet the vast majority of the people near him will be strangers. An indi-
vidual's behavior in all of these contexts will be constrained by norms.
Not surprisingly, cooperation can be observed in intermediate-
knit environments as well. Matthew Rabin provides a particularly in-
teresting illustration concerning voluntary water conservation efforts:
Consider the question of why people conserve water during a
drought. Clearly they perceive that conservation contributes to
the general good, which at a small cost is something they eagerly
do.... [B]ecause the marginal social value of water is greater the
less water there is, there are diminishing social benefits of con-
servation: If other people conserve, it is less urgent for you to do
so; if other people don't conserve, it is more urgent for you to do
so. If you were a simple altruist, therefore, learning that others
were not conserving would cause you to intensify your conserva-
tion efforts. This prediction is inconsistent with intuition and em-
pirical evidence: People are more inclined to conserve water if
they think other people are conserving, not if they think others
are splurging. People reciprocate the lack of public spiritedness
in others-they don't counteract it.32
Publicly watering one's lawn during a drought is therefore particularly
harmful, not so much because of the water that is used, but because
those who see the watering will be less likely to conserve.
Staying with the image of the suburban homeowner watering his
lawn, we are confronted with two plausible accounts of why the condi-
tional cooperation that Rabin describes emerges. Perhaps a home-
owner knows a number of his neighbors and does not want to lose
their respect by appearing to be a wastrel. Or perhaps he is the type of
person who will sacrifice for the common good so long as doing so
does not make him feel like a "sucker." If he believes that people on
the other side of town are seeing their lawns turn brown as a result of
voluntary conservation, he will curtail his own lawn watering, regard-
32 Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J Econ Lit 11, 21 (1998). The suburban
neighborhood is intermediate-knit because a homeowner is likely to know his immediate
neighbors, and perhaps a few others who live nearby, but unlikely to know or come into contact
with the vast majority of the people who drive by his residence on a given day.
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less of whether he knows the cross-town non-irrigators, and regardless
of whether he cares about what his immediate neighbors think of him.
The former explanation for his conservation is a close-knit account,
and the latter is a loose-knit account.
The question of which explanation predominates is hardly aca-
demic. If policymakers believe that water conservation is mostly ac-
counted for by a loose-knit motivation, they should focus their atten-
tion on trying to convince those homeowners whose property abuts
the suburb's major thoroughfares to forego watering their lawns. By
the same token, they should devote very little attention to encourag-
ing those who live on cul de sacs to conserve. Deviations between ac-
tual levels of cooperation and perceived levels of cooperation can be
important. Regimes that can magnify the cooperative efforts of some
members while masking the noncooperative actions of others may
therefore trigger cooperative cascades.33
Although both accounts of water conservation are plausible, and
the two accounts are by no means mutually exclusive, empirical data
could shed light on what theory works best. The relevant data would
compare private water conservation (for example, taking shorter
showers) to public water conservation (for example, reducing lawn
watering). If visible reductions in lawn watering also encourage pri-
vate conservation, then a loose-knit account would seem to be the
more powerful explanation. But if such public reductions do not en-
gender private conservation, then a close-knit account seems more
plausible."
IV. INTERMEDIATE-KNIT ISSUES
Understanding how cooperative social norms emerge in interme-
diate-knit settings has ramifications well beyond water conservation
policy. In this Part, I will discuss norms that exist in a number of other
intermediate-knit environments and suggest how understanding close-
knit and loose-knit dynamics can assist the policymakers who must
confront a series of management challenges.
A. Riots
What factors caused riots to spread through Los Angeles follow-
ing the jury verdict acquitting the police officers who beat up Rodney
King?" To what extent did television coverage of early violence fol-
33 See Strahilevitz, 89 Va L Rev (cited in note 10).
34 In the minds of some, this data would not resolve the question on the grounds that peo-
ple might learn water conservation in public settings and then unthinkingly take those behaviors
with them into private settings-via a process of norm internalization.
35 See generally Bert Useem, The State and Collective Disorders: The Los Angeles
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lowing the verdict help spread more violence throughout the city? " By
knowing whether an individual's decision to participate in a riot or
looting is primarily influenced by the actions of his acquaintances or
by the strangers whose actions he is witnessing, we can understand, for
example, the extent to which dispersing a crowd and forcing group
members to flee in opposite directions will be anything more than a
temporary stop-gap measure. We might also better understand what
strategies governments or community organizations might adopt to
diminish the likelihood that a riot will break out in the first place. Fi-
nally, by learning about the extent to which media coverage of mob
action spurs others to imitate members of the anonymous mob, we can
guide journalists who wish to provide responsible coverage of public
disturbances without inflaming a dangerous situation.
B. Mardi Gras
During the late 1990s, New Orleans city officials attempted to
crack down on the relatively new but robust Mardi Gras practice of
disrobing in exchange for plastic beads.37 Police officers began jailing
some disrobers and enforcing steep fines." Yet by that time a cascade
had already occurred: Disrobement was evidently so widespread that
police had a difficult time sanctioning enough people to undermine
the disrobement norm. 9 By 2001, the police had admitted an inability
to prevent the exchanges, and the Police Superintendent announced
coyly that officers would "make arrests only when bare breasts posed
a threat to public safety."'* If New Orleans officials are sincerely com-
mitted to lessening disrobement, they might consider a norms-based
approach. Because Mardi Gras in the French Quarter is an intermedi-
ate-knit environment, however, it is unclear what strategy they should
pursue. Those who disrobe usually attend Mardi Gras in the company
of friends," and participating in the festivities by disrobing may be a
Riot/Protest of April, 1992,76 Soc Forces 357,363-65 (1997).
36 See id at 364.
37 See Stewart Yerton, Is This a Good Image for Carnival Tourism?, New Orleans Times-
Picayune F1 (Feb 27, 2000). On the disrobement practice generally, see Laurie A. Wilkie, Beads
and Breasts: The Negotiation of Gender Roles and Power at New Orleans Mardi Gras, in Lidia D.
Sciama and Joanne B. Eicher, eds, Beads and Bead Makers: Gender, Material Culture and Mean-
ing 193 (Berg 1998); Wesley Shrum and John Kilburn, Ritual Disrobement at Mardi Gras: Cere-
monial Exchange and Moral Order, 75 Soc Forces 423,429,446 (1996).
38 Anne Rochell Konigsmark, Mardi Gras: Showdown: 'Baring' Means Bead and Possibly
Arrest, Atlanta J & Const 3A (Mar 4,2000).
39 See C.J. Forsyth, Parade Strippers: A Note on Being Naked in Public, 13 Deviant Beh 391,
395 (1992) ("It is a sheer numbers game for the police; they do not have the resources to enforce
[disrobement laws during Mardi Gras]."). See also Brett Martel, N.O. Mardi Gras Better Behaved
than Other Cities, Baton Rouge Adv 4B (Mar 1, 2001).
40 Blind Eye to Bare Breasts, The Advertiser 28 (Feb 23,2001).
41 See William Jankowiak and C. Todd White, Carnival on the Clipboard: An Ethnological
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way of signaling particular traits that are valued by members of the
close-knit peer group. On the other hand, maybe festival-goers' obser-
vations of disrobers on balconies and their fleeting interactions with
strangers holding beads somehow cause them to get "swept up" in a
loose-knit moment of mass revelry and debauchery.
A close-knit strategy might use privacy laws as a means of influ-
encing social norms. Currently, a large number of amateur and profes-
sional film makers bring video cameras to Mardi Gras." In two well-
publicized lawsuits, women who have exposed themselves at Mardi
Gras and subsequently saw those images on soft-core pornographic
videotapes sued the videotape producers for tortious invasion of pri-
vacy.3 Distributing images of a topless woman without her consent or-
dinarily constitutes an invasion of privacy.4' These cases have therefore
hinged on whether the women implicitly consented to having their
images distributed widely when they publicly disrobed at Mardi Gras.45
Holding that the dissemination of these video images amounts to an
invasion of privacy essentially limits the audience for a disrobement to
the approving peers and anonymous audience members. But holding
that the women, by disrobing in a public place at Mardi Gras, have re-
linquished any expectations of privacy expands the potential audience
to include the friends, acquaintances, business associates, and relatives
that the disrober may have elsewhere. People are members of multiple
close-knit communities, and the types of behaviors that win esteem
among the close-knit group that has gone to Mardi Gras may curry
disfavor among members of a close-knit group back home.
Now suppose the loose-knit account of Mardi Gras dominates.
Policymakers should probably crack down on the most visible forms
of disrobement- those occurring on the balconies that line the French
Quarter's streets. There is some evidence suggesting that balcony dis-
robement might set the tone for the widespread disrobement occur-
ring on the French Quarter's streets during Mardi Gras. By removing
Study of New Orleans Mardi Gras, 4 Ethnology 335,338-39,344 (1999).
42 See Shrum and Kilburn, 75 Soc Forces at 432 (cited in note 37).
43 See Chris Rose, Carnival Knowledge: The Case of the Coed Who Bared for Beads and
Wound up Starring in a Voyeuristic Video, New Orleans Times-Picayune (Living) 1 (Jan 10, 2002)
(discussing the filing of a suit in Florida by a student at Florida State University and New Or-
leans Mardi Gras disrober). See also Privacy Frontier, Natl L J A22 (July 15,2002) (discussing a
Louisiana court's dismissal of such a suit, brought by three Jane Doe coeds).
44 See, for example, Dunn v Moto Photo, Inc, 828 SW2d 747,748-49,754-55 (Tenn Ct App
1992).
45 See 'Girls Gone Wild' Producer Wins Lawsuit, PR Newswire (Financial News) (June 4,
2002).
46 See Shrum and Kilburn, 75 Soc Forces at 453 n 23 (cited in note 37) ("The police termi-
nate celebrations at the stroke of Midnight on Tuesday by the simple method of removing people
from the balconies and restricting pedestrians to the sidewalks on Bourbon Street. In short, they
encourage participants to leave by eliminating the kind of hierarchical interactions discussed
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the most visible disrobers from their exposed perches, police would be
eliminating an important stimulus for the disrobement below.
C. Voting
What factors help bring voters to the polls in democratic elec-
tions? Why is turnout so high in some countries and so low in others?
Is it possible that voters reciprocate the voting behavior of their fellow
citizens? If so, which citizens' behavior matters? On a close-knit ac-
count, a voter might be more likely to vote if she is informed that all
her neighbors or coworkers have voted. In that case, a secretary of
state who is interested in boosting turnout might devote her resources
toward selecting block captains who will go door-to-door in the eve-
ning, encouraging those on their blocks to vote. On a loose-knit ac-
count, a citizen may be less likely to make it to the polls if she is in-
formed that turnout in her jurisdiction is expected to be less than 50
percent. By the same token, a loose-knit account might render a secre-
tary of state's widely publicized, pre-election predictions that turnout
is expected to be low a self-fulfilling prophecy.
D. Bone Marrow Donations
In 1987 the National Marrow Donor Program (NMDP) was cre-
ated to assist leukemia patients who need bone marrow transplants in
finding suitable donors.7 Since the program's creation, more than
11,000 individuals have donated bone marrow to unrelated patients.,8
A bone marrow donor is hospitalized as part of the procedure, can
expect substantial discomfort, misses work, and runs a small, but not
negligible, risk of life-threatening complications.49 By participating in
the program a donor thus incurs substantial costs in order to benefit a
network of strangers whom the donor has never met. Patients typi-
cally receive a transplant from the most suitable willing donor, from
among several possible matches. A bone marrow donor therefore
helps not only the recipient of his bone marrow, but also another
anonymous leukemia patient as well, by freeing up another registry
member to donate to him.
A comprehensive study of early bone marrow donors revealed
that many donors told their relatives and acquaintances about their
decisions to become donors, although some chose to keep their dona-
below.").
47 Roberta G. Simmons, et al, The Self-Image of Unrelated Bone Marrow Donors, 34 J
Health & Soc Beh 285,286 (1993).
48 National Marrow Donor Program, Marrow Donation FAQs, online at http://
www.marrow.org/FAQS/marrow-faqs.html (visited Dec 2,2002).
49 Simmons, et al, 34 J Health & Soc Beh at 287 (cited in note 47).
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tions a secret.' Moreover, many donors valued participation in the
program as a way of setting themselves apart as more altruistic than
ordinary members of society." Evidently, the anonymous donors
among them were drawn to bone marrow donation at least in part be-
cause they knew that this costly donation was such a rare act. Becom-
ing part of an elite, altruistic vanguard improved many donors' self-
esteem. 2 In that sense, these early donors can be seen as the opposite
of the conditional cooperators (for example, peer-to-peer file sharers
or suburban water conservationists) discussed above. A smaller group
of donors saw donation as an opportunity to become role models in
their respective close-knit communities.3 The evidence therefore sug-
gests that both close-knit and loose-knit factors help explain bone
marrow donation to strangers.
Knowing to what extent a loose-knit or close-knit account ex-
plains this behavior could help the NMDP develop better strategies to
attract new donors. Close-knit strategies would facilitate donors' abil-
ity to spread the word of their acts to their friends, families, coworkers,
and acquaintances. Loose-knit strategies would emphasize the dra-
matic shortage of bone marrow donors and the large numbers of leu-
kemia sufferers awaiting transplants. This is tricky terrain, of course, as
too much publicity for close-knit donors might well discourage the
would-be loose-knit donors who are part of another donor's close-knit
group. The complex bone marrow donation evidence suggests that
loose-knit strategies to alter social norms must be tailored to the pecu-
liar circumstances of a particular environment. Strategies that worked
for Napster might prove counterproductive if tried by the NMDP
CONCLUSION
Modern social-norms scholarship began in rural Shasta County,
but a few scholars have begun taking tentative steps toward the big
city in search of norms. Over the next decade, we can expect to see an
acceleration of this urbanization movement, as scholars begin con-
ducting their own studies and drawing on the work of internet and ur-
ban sociologists to examine whether efficient social norms can arise in
environments characterized by anonymity and a lack of repeat play-
ers."' As social-norms scholars urbanize, some structure will be helpful.
In particular, studies that recognize the differences between loose-knit
50 See id at 291-92.
51 See id at 289-91,293-94,296-97.
52 See id at 294-95.
53 See id at 292.
54 See generally Lyn H. Lofland, A World of Strangers: Order and Action in Urban Public
Space ix-x (Basic 1973) ("To experience the city is, among many other things, to experience
anonymity. To cope with the city is, among many other things, to cope with strangers.").
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groups and intermediate-knit groups will teach us a great deal about
the mechanisms by which these norms arise, are enforced, and con-
tribute to cooperation. We might well conclude that certain mecha-
nisms explain the emergence of cooperation-enhancing social norms
in close-knit settings, whereas quite different mechanisms explain the
emergence of cooperation-enhancing norms in loose-knit settings. If
so, it will be particularly important to study as many intermediate-knit
groups as we can find, so that our strategies for influencing social
norms can better reflect the boundaries between the realms of ra-
tional choice and reciprocity.
